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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we propose a model of credit rating agencies using the global games 
framework to incorporate information and coordination problems. We introduce a 
refined utility function of a credit rating agency that, additional to reputation 
maximization, also embeds aspects of competition and feedback effects of the rating 
on the rated firms. Apart from hinting at explanations for several hypotheses with 
regard to agencies' optimal rating assessments, our model suggests that the 
existence of rating agencies may decrease the incidence of multiple equilibria. If 
investors have discretionary power over the precision of their private information, 
we can prove that public rating announcements and private information collection 
are complements rather than substitutes in order to secure uniqueness of 
equilibrium. In this respect, rating agencies may spark off a virtuous circle that 
increases the efficiency of the market outcome. 
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1 Introduction
Despite a lot of recent research e®ort, the role of credit rating agencies in the mar-
ket's investment process is still not very well understood. On the one hand, due
to the secrecy of rating agencies the rating process itself remains unclear, on the
other hand, observers still struggle to understand how the market perceives this
process and how the rating in°uences the rated ¯rms and their outstanding debt.
Especially the lack of a solid theoretical basis in grasping these issues is one of the
main shortcomings of the academic research to date.1 The current paper tries to
¯ll this gap. As one of the ¯rst approaches in this respect, we introduce a re¯ned
utility function of a credit rating agency along which the optimal rating is de-
rived. In accordance with empirical ¯ndings and anecdotal evidence, we consider
three di®erent utility components. Additional to maximizing her reputation, we
presume that a rating agency also has to take into account competitive pressures
from other agencies or from institutions that sell similar products.2 Furthermore,
we suppose that each agency has reason to account for potential feedback e®ects
that her rating may have on the rated ¯rms in order to secure future business
with these ¯rms.3 Based on the optimally derived rating, we then analyze the
in°uence of the rating on investment decisions. Additionally, we discuss the way
in which the existence of a rating agency can help to eliminate the uncertainty re-
sulting from multiple equilibria on the market and examine the di®erence between
solicited and unsolicited ratings. Even though we do not tackle the process of the
watch-list, we take into account regulatory issues that in°uence the investment
decisions of institutional investors in particular.
Contrary to what has been stated in an earlier paper by Carlson and Hale (2005),
we ¯nd that the existence of rating agencies does not necessarily increase the in-
cidence of multiple equilibria. Rather, as long as the rating agency pursues other
aims besides maximizing her reputation, a unique equilibrium may be restored -
even though the agency, by announcing her rating publicly and as such increas-
ing the precision of public information in the market, makes coordination among
investors easier, thereby facilitating the emergence of multiple equilibria. If in-
vestors have discretionary power over the precision of their private information,
we can prove that public rating announcements and private information collec-
tion are complements rather than substitutes in order to secure the prevalence of
a unique equilibrium. In this respect, rating agencies may spark o® a virtuous
circle: The more accurate the announced ratings are, the higher is investors' in-
centive to increase the precision of their private information as well, which raises
the e±ciency of the market outcome.
1This is also one of the main conclusions by Cantor (2004) in the editorial of the November
2004 Special Issue on Credit Ratings of the Journal of Banking and Finance.
2The view that the credit rating industry is competitive and reputation-driven is the dom-
inant one held by scholars. See for instance Cantor and Packer (1994) and Smith and Walter
(2001) as advocates of this view but also Partnoy (2001) for an alternative position.
3This point is emphasized in the Special Report Credit-rating agencies of The Economist
(March 26th 2005).2
With regard to the di®erence between solicited and unsolicited ratings, we ¯nd
that it is indeed contingent on the gap between the rating agency's private infor-
mation about the ¯rm's credit quality and the quality a priori expected by the
market. Hence, unsolicited rating are seriously downward-biased as compared to
solicited ratings for ¯rms who can disclose very optimistic private information
about their credit quality to the agency while the market a priori expects a much
lower quality. However, solicited ratings are strongly in°uenced by the di®erent
components of the agency's utility function. As such, we ¯nd that for su±ciently
good private information, a solicited rating will be the higher the more emphasis
is put on the reputational aim and the less weight is attached to competitive and
feedback concerns. Again, the opposite holds for su±ciently bad private informa-
tion obtained by the rating agency. Interestingly, if we look at the market e®ects
of ratings, we ¯nd that in particular those ¯rms have a high incentive to request
a solicited rating that feel to be treated unfairly by the market, i.e. that believe
to be able to disclose much more optimistic information to the rating agency than
what has commonly been expected by the market. For them, the higher solicited
rating would strongly reduce their probability of default. Our model therefore
relates the observed downward-bias of unsolicited ratings to an adverse selection
problem between ¯rms that believe to be of high quality and those that believe
to be of lower quality.
Regarding the rating agency's \ability" to assess the relative risk of corporate
bonds, we prove anecdotal evidence to be true that agencies of higher ability
tend to announce more extreme ratings than do agencies of lower ability. This
requires, however, that they indeed do take into account additional aims than
simply maximizing their reputation. If this condition is satis¯ed, we ¯nd that a
rating agency of higher ability will announce a higher rating after observing good
private information than an agency of lower ability. The opposite holds for the
case of bad information.
Finally, we show that the typical bond market segregation between institution-
alized and non-institutionalized investors increases the probability of default for
lowly-rated ¯rms. This result is due to the fact that institutionalized investors
are usually required to invest only in investment-grade ¯rms. For highly-rated
¯rms, the existence of institutional investors is bene¯cial as long as the o®ered
repayment of the bonds is su±ciently high.
The explicit introduction of a rating agency's utility function notwithstanding,
our model does not take into account aspects such as the optimal \level of rating
activity" or more generally the optimal collection of private information because
we do not allow for additional costs from collecting and processing information.
Additionally, we assume the weights attached to the di®erent utility components
to be exogenous rather than deriving them optimally and as such assigning a
strategic role to the credit rating agency. We leave these further re¯nements for
future research.
The paper is related to various strands of the literature. The ¯rst is the literature
on reputational concerns and reliability of information provided by certi¯cation
intermediaries such as rating agencies. Mariano (2005) develops a model which3
analyzes this relationship in the context of both a monopolistic and a duopolistic
certi¯cation industry.4 Because of a di®erent modelling setup, her paper has to
abstract from a potential coordination function of the credit rating agency and
does not consider multiplicity of equilibria.
The second strand of literature builds on signalling models in the tradition of
Spence (1973) and examines how di®erent types of ¯rms can signal their quality
to the market when there is asymmetric information between ¯rm insiders and
market participants. Byoun and Shin (2002) model signalling behavior of ¯rms
in an environment in which ¯rms can choose a rating agency as an information
specialist who is able to obtain and convey information at lowest costs. They
develop conditions for a separating equilibrium where only good ¯rms signal their
quality through the rating agency. Their paper di®ers from ours in many respects.
Most importantly, it does not consider the interplay between private and public
information and gives no active role to the credit rating agency.
Most closely related to our work are the papers by Boot et al. (2005) and Carl-
son and Hale (2005). Boot et al. (2005) show that credit ratings can serve as
a coordinating mechanism in situations of multiple equilibria. In addition, they
explore in detail how a monitoring role vis-µ a-vis a ¯rm is put in place through
the credit watch procedure used by credit rating agencies. In their model, the
practice of institutional investors to condition their investment behavior on the
rating enforces an implicit contract between the ¯rm and the credit rating agency
where the former promises not to misbehave because this may endanger her credit
standing. While we share the focus on multiple equilibria with Boot et al. (2005),
the methodological contribution of our paper is quite di®erent. We apply the
global games theory to examine under which conditions uniqueness of equilibrium
can be achieved. This allows us to investigate in detail the role of a credit rating
agency in providing information to the market rather than performing a monitor-
ing role, when the rating agency simultaneously ful¯lls a coordinating function.
Carlson and Hale (2005) also propose a model of rating agencies as an application
of the global games methodology. However, they do not introduce an explicit
utility function for the rating agency. Further di®erences between the two papers
will be discussed at several occasions during the following sections.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
setup of our model. Section 3 derives the agency's optimal rating. Section 4
discusses the condition for a unique equilibrium. Sections 5 to 7 analyze the
di®erence between solicited and unsolicited ratings and their impact on investors'
actions. Section 8 concludes.
4Also Benabou and Laroque (1992) and Morris (2001) are important examples of this litera-
ture. Both papers develop repeated cheap talk models of a sender of information whose honesty
is unknown to the information receivers.4
2 The model
In a very simple model we capture the interaction between a ¯rm, a continuum of
investors5 and a credit rating agency (CRA).6 The ¯rm has outstanding debt from
ongoing business projects that has to be repaid at maturity. Based on private and
public information about the ¯rm's quality (respectively the projects' quality) and
a published credit rating, investors have to decide whether or not to prolong credit
in the intermediate period.
We assume that the ¯rm's quality is a random variable µ, normally distributed
with mean y and variance 1=a. The distribution of µ is common knowledge in the
market and may as such be referred to as public information. The lower a, the
higher is the ¯rm's fundamental risk, since ¯rm quality µ may deviate strongly
from the ex-ante expected value y. Each market participant additionally observes
a private signal about ¯rm quality: xijµ » N(µ;1=b). These private signals may
simply be characterized as investors' individual interpretations of the publicly
available information about ¯rm quality. The higher b, the more closely are in-
vestors' private signals distributed around the unknown ¯rm quality µ. In this
respect, b denotes the precision of investors' private information. Similarly, the
rating agency collects information about the ¯rm that results in a private signal
of xAjµ » N(µ;1=c). Note that private signals are assumed to be independent of
each other.
The time line of the model is as follows:
² In t = 0, the ¯rm has outstanding debt that has to be repaid at a rate
of R per unit of debt at maturity (t = 2). Firm quality µ is represented
by a random variable taken from N(y;1=a). This distribution is common
knowledge in the market.
² In t = 1, investors observe individual private signals xi about ¯rm quality.
The rating agency observes a private signal xA. Based on her information,
the rating agency publicly announces the rating z. Investors update their
beliefs and decide on whether to prolong credit or withdraw early. Early
withdrawal is not connected to any premium or punishment and hence de-
livers a payment of 1 per unit of capital.
² The ¯rm's projects can mature successfully in t = 2, if a proportion of less
than µ of outstanding debt has been withdrawn prematurely. The ¯rm then
repays debt out of the realized project payo®, which is equal to V . Otherwise
the ¯rm defaults.
5The assumption of atomistic investors is made in order to keep the analysis as simple as
possible. It is not critical for the derivation of results as has been shown by Morris and Shin
(2003).
6Note that even though we consider only one rating agency explicitly, this agency has to
assess credit quality under the threat of potential competition from other agencies. However,
competition between agencies is not modelled directly in our setup.5
In this simple formulation, V is a constant larger than R. Fundamental variable
µ measures the ¯rm's ability to meet short term claims from creditors. This very
simple payo® function implies that the recovery rate conditional on default is
independent of µ (Morris and Shin, 2004).
In order to derive a benchmark result, let us ¯rst consider the case without a
rating agency. Equilibrium values are denoted by subindices \W". In this case,
investors have to base their decisions of whether or not to prolong credit solely
on the common prior about µ and on their private signals xi.
Essentially, the depicted model presents a global game in the sense of Carlsson
and van Damme (1993), where each player noisily observes the game's payo®
structure, which itself is determined by a random draw from a given class of games.
Following the solution method of Morris and Shin (2003, 2004) we can derive
a unique equilibrium, provided that private information is su±ciently precise.
The equilibrium is then characterized by trigger strategies, so that each investor
extends his loan whenever he obtains a private signal xi higher than a trigger
value x¤
W and withdraws credit otherwise. Similarly, the ¯rm defaults if a quality
value lower than µ¤
W is realized.
Each investor has to choose either to withdraw his money early, i.e. in t = 1, in
which case each unit of investment will be safely repaid, or to prolong credit. This
risky choice delivers a repayment of R in t = 2, if the project matures successfully
and zero otherwise. The project will be successful only if the ¯rm's fundamental
value µ is su±ciently high, i.e. larger than µ¤
W. The marginal investor will be
indi®erent between foreclosing and extending credit if both actions deliver the
same expected payo®:
1 = R ¢ prob(µ ¸ µ
¤
Wjxi;z) : (1)
If there is no credit rating agency on the market, investors' posterior beliefs about
µ are given by:
µjxi » N
Ã
ay + bxi
a + b
;
1
a + b
!
: (2)
Plugging this in (1) delivers the indi®erence condition for the individual investor:
x
¤
W =
a + b
b
µ
¤
W ¡
a
b
y ¡
p
a + b
b
©
¡1
³R ¡ 1
R
´
: (3)
The ¯rm's projects, however, need a critical mass of investment in order to pro-
ceed successfully. This condition may also be interpreted as the ¯rm being able to
re¯nance internally a certain amount of withdrawn debt. The amount of re¯nanc-
ing that the ¯rm can master depends on the ¯rm's ¯nancial strength or quality.
For simplicity it is assumed that the ¯rm has to default whenever the proportion
of withdrawn debt, denoted by l, is higher than ¯rm quality µ. The ¯rm will
therefore be on the brink of default if:
µ = l = prob(x · x
¤
Wjµ)
µ = ©(
p
b(xi ¡ µ)) : (4)6
Note that due to the assumed independence of private signals, the proportion
of investors withdrawing their loans prematurely (after observing su±ciently low
private signals) is equivalent to the probability with which an individual investor
obtains private information lower than x¤
W.
Combining indi®erence conditions (3) and (4) yields the equilibrium threshold
value µ¤
W below which the ¯rm's projects will optimally be abandoned, since the
proportion of withdrawn capital is too high to warrant any further internal re¯-
nancing on the part of the ¯rm. For quality values of µ above µ¤
W, however, the
projects will be continued with certainty, even though there might still be some
credit foreclosure. This withdrawal of capital is yet su±ciently small as not to
force the ¯rm into default. Equilibrium value µ¤
W is given by:
µ
¤
W = ©
³ a
p
b
(µ
¤
W ¡ y) ¡
r
a + b
b
©
¡1
³R ¡ 1
R
´´
: (5)
Given µ¤
W, the equilibrium threshold value x¤
W for investors' private signals is given
by (3). Hence, an investor will foreclose his loan early whenever he observes a
private signal about ¯rm quality lower than x¤
W and rolls over otherwise.
As a su±cient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium, consider that the two
indi®erence conditions as represented by (3) and (4) must not cross more than
once. Solving (4) for xi and deriving both functions with respect to µ¤, it can
easily be seen that a su±cient condition for a unique equilibrium is given by
b > a2=(2¼). It requires that behavioral uncertainty, introduced via the variance
in traders' individual private signals, 1=b, does not become too strong as compared
to fundamental uncertainty as represented by the variance 1=a of the ¯rm's quality
value µ.7 Stated di®erently, private information on the part of investors must be
su±ciently precise relative to the precision a of public information about µ.
Note that if the exact value of µ were common knowledge in the market, multiple
equilibria would be obtained for µ 2 [0;1]. For these intermediate values of µ it
would therefore not be possible to predict whether the ¯rm's debt would default
or not as both outcomes are fully rational. Whenever an investor believed that
su±ciently many other investors might withdraw their loans early, it would be
optimal for him to withdraw as well, thereby vindicating any investor's decision
to foreclose the loan, so that eventually they will all do so. If, in contrast, he
expected others to extend their loans, it would be pro¯t-maximizing for him to
extend as well, leading to coordination on the e±cient equilibrium. The complete
lack of behavioral uncertainty hence gives rise to multiple equilibria based on self-
ful¯lling expectations. Even if the public knowledge about the ¯rm's quality were
faulty, so that fundamental uncertainty prevailed, multiplicity of equilibria would
not vanish because investors still held homogeneous, yet erroneous, beliefs (Sbracia
and Zaghini, 2001), which guarantees behavioral certainty. Multiple equilibria
may, however, be eliminated if investors form heterogeneous beliefs about µ due
to individual private information. As long as behavioral uncertainty arising from
7What we call behavioral uncertainty corresponds to the notion of strategic uncertainty in
Morris and Shin (2002, 2003, 2004). Both terms will be used interchangeably.7
imprecise private signals is not too strong, a unique equilibrium is obtained that
allows to predict the aggregate market solution for each quality value µ.
Now consider the case of a credit rating agency publicly announcing her rating
in t = 1. For the time being, in order to simplify the presentation of equilibrium
we assume the rating z to be exogenously given and normally distributed with a
variance of 1=d. The optimal rating will endogenously be derived in section 3.
The announcement of rating z brings additional public information to the market
and leads investors to update their beliefs to:
µjxi;z » N
³ay + bxi + dz
a + b + d
;
1
a + b + d
´
:
Based on the same analysis as above, the unique equilibrium value for ¯rm quality
with a rating agency being present, µ¤, is then derived as:
µ
¤ = ©
Ã
1
p
b
³
a(µ
¤ ¡ y) + d(µ
¤ ¡ z) ¡
p
a + b + d©
¡1
³R ¡ 1
R
´´
!
; (6)
with the equilibrium value for private signals given by:
x
¤ =
a + b + d
b
µ
¤ ¡
a
b
y ¡
d
b
z ¡
p
a + b + d
b
©
¡1
³R ¡ 1
R
´
: (7)
For quality values higher than µ¤, the ¯rm will never default since a su±ciently
large number of investors will optimally decide to roll over debt. A ¯rm quality
less than µ¤, in contrast, will always lead to a default by the ¯rm. Note, however,
that for 0 < µ · µ¤ a default is always ine±cient since it has not been triggered
by a su±ciently bad ¯rm quality but simply by the number of investors that
decided to withdraw their money early.8 Uniqueness of equilibrium hence does
not eliminate ine±ciencies. Default occurring in the range of µ 2 [0;µ¤] represents
a coordination failure on the part of investors.
Uniqueness of equilibrium in the case where a credit rating agency is present
requires that:
b >
(a + d)2
2¼
:
Note that in this general case with exogenous rating, the uniqueness condition is
stricter than in the absence of a CRA as long as the precision of her rating, d, is
perceived to be larger than zero. This is due to the fact that the announced rating
increases the precision of information that is public in the market. This result
has also been emphasized by Carlson and Hale (2005). However, the condition is
su±cient but not necessary for uniqueness of equilibrium. We will return to the
question of the CRA's e®ect on uniqueness versus multiplicity of equilibria and
the desirability of each from an investor's point of view in section 4.
8Default is e±cient only for µ < 0, since in that case, even if all lenders decided to roll over,
termination of the project would still be pro¯t maximizing for the ¯rm. The same is true in the
case without a rating agency.8
3 Optimal Rating
Whereas the preceding section treated the announced rating as exogenous, we will
now derive the optimal rating from the CRA's utility function and her information
about the ¯rm's quality µ.
Based on empirical and anecdotal evidence, we consider the following utility func-
tion to hold for the rating agency. In contrast to earlier studies, we assume that a
credit rating agency i is not only concerned with the informational content of her
rating, zi, but also has to take into account the potential e®ects of competition,
i.e. her competitors' ratings zj, and of her own actions on her future business.
These aspects are mirrored in the following utility function:
ui(zi;µ) = ¡(1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)(zi ¡ µ)
2 ¡ r1(Li ¡ ¹ L) ¡ r2 q prob(defaultjxA) ; (8)
with
Li =
Z 1
0
(zj ¡ zi)
2dj
and
¹ L =
Z 1
0
Ljdj :
The ¯rst part in the CRA's utility function displays her aim to increase reputation
by disclosing a rating zi that is as close as possible to the unknown ¯rm quality µ.
This reputational objective enters the utility function with a weight of (1¡r1¡r2).
Based on the idea of the \island economy" by Lucas (1972, 1973) and Phelps
(1970) that formalizes the coordination motive of agents as examined by Morris
and Shin (2002), the CRA's utility function also includes an additional \beauty-
contest" term as the second part. Since a rating agency will only be able to
successfully place her ratings on the market, if ¯rms are willing to buy her exper-
tise and if investors are willing to base their investment decisions on the announced
rating, it is reasonable to assume that the market structure forces rating agencies
to try to generate ratings that are close to the potential average rating. This
competitive aim induces the CRA to reduce her risk of either losing the ¯rm as
a future customer by announcing a below-average rating or of losing investors as
users of her information-provision by announcing in°ated ratings that might in-
crease their portfolio risk substantially. This aim essentially arises from a CRA's
role as an intermediary between ¯rms and investors. We assume that the CRA
attaches a weight of r1 to this argument of her utility function.
Finally, we presume that a rating agency also accounts for the potential feedback-
e®ect that her rating might have on the ¯rm's probability of default. In this
respect the CRA should try not to contribute to an (ine±cient) ¯rm default via
the announcement of her rating. If she succeeds in helping the ¯rm to stay as a
going-concern, she might be able to extract additional fees, q, from future business
with the ¯rm. This feedback-argument enters the CRA's utility function with a
weight of r2.
There has been plenty of empirical and anecdotal evidence supporting the di®erent
objectives in the CRA's utility function. Schwarcz (2002), for instance, argues that9
simple market forces lead rating agencies to guard their reputation. Otherwise
investors will no longer pay attention to their ratings so that issuers will not pay
their fees any more. Generally, we may see this argument to hold particularly in
a long-run perspective.
Recent years have seen the expansion of a large number of potential competi-
tors to the established credit rating agencies (The Economist, 2005). Apart from
smaller, country-speci¯c rating agencies, there is also a growing importance of
other predictors of default, for instance via ¯nancial derivatives such as credit
default swaps. Yet, competition between established CRAs remains tough. Still,
Hill (2004) remarks that the market perception of potential rating biases curbs
excessive rating competition and instead promotes dissemination of average rat-
ings. Certainly, short-run considerations give bite to the competitive argument in
the CRA's utility function that induces her to reduce risk by not deviating too
strongly from her competitors' ratings.
Additional proof of the beauty-contest argument and even more detailed hypothe-
ses come from a recent German experience. On June 19, 2005, the so-called
\GewÄ ahrtrÄ agerhaftung" and \Anstaltslast", a maintenance obligation and im-
plied liability of the German public sector for the state banks' public debt, was
abolished by the German government because of pressure on the part of the EU
competition commission. Contrary to what has been expected, however, the state
banks' ratings did not deteriorate after the event. Rather, the required two ratings
for each bank remained at a very high level. It was found that particularly those
rating agencies that were notorious for being very strict in their rating assessment,
were not appointed by the banks to generate a rating. Rather, more generous rat-
ings were announced that complied with the average rating of the German banking
landscape. Rating counsellors publicly stated at the time that competition be-
tween rating agencies leads agencies to reduce their risk by announcing average
ratings, while only agencies of very high ability and long-standing experience dare
to disclose \extreme" ratings (Von Heusinger, 2005). This hypothesis will be taken
up again and tested in section 5.
Finally, plenty anecdotal evidence suggests support for the feedback-argument in
a rating agency's utility function. In particular the existence of rating triggers
forces rating agencies to be cautious in their rating process (Hill, 2004). With
respect to the Enron case, for instance, it has been mentioned that one reason
why the rating agencies acted very late (arguably too late) was that they did not
want to begin a downgrading spiral started o® by a ¯rst downgrading followed by
an increase in credit costs due to rating triggers, which would again have increased
Enron's probability of default, leading to an even lower rating etc (The Economist,
2005).
Derivation of the optimal rating requires the following steps. A full description
is given in appendix A. The optimal rating zi will maximize the CRA's expected
utility function and is, thus, given by:
zi =
1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2
1 ¡ r2
E(µjxA) +
r1
1 ¡ r2
E(¹ zjxA) ¡
r2
1 ¡ r2
1
2
qÁ(¢)
p
a + c
@µ¤
@zi
; (9)
where ¹ z denotes the average rating. If we assume a linear strategy as optimal10
for a rating agency, we may average over all potential ratings. Plugging this in
the optimal rating function (9) and comparing coe±cients delivers the following
optimal rating for a CRA:
zi =
(1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c
(1 ¡ r2)a + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c
xA +
(1 ¡ r2)a
(1 ¡ r2)a + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c
y
¡
r2
1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2
1
2
q Á(¢)
p
a + c
@µ¤
@zi
: (10)
As can be seen, the optimal rating is in°uenced by the CRA's private information
about the ¯rm, xA, the prior expected ¯rm quality, y, and - due to the feedback-
argument - also by the impact of the rating itself on the equilibrium threshold
value separating defaulting from non-defaulting ¯rms, µ¤. Note that @µ¤=@zi < 0.
Therefore, the fact that the rating agency takes into account the in°uence of her
rating on the ¯rm's default risk leads her to increase her rating.
It is furthermore interesting to note that r2, the weight attached to the feedback
argument, decreases the impact of both the CRA's private information xA and of
the prior mean y on the optimal rating, while r1, the weighting factor put on the
competitive aim, decreases the e®ect of xA but increase the e®ect of y. Hence, the
more importance the CRA attaches to the competition argument, the stronger
will the optimal rating be in°uenced by the prior mean y and the less will it be
a®ected by the CRA's private information. If more weight is put on the feedback
component, however, the impact of y and xA is decreased. Placing more emphasis
on the reputation aim, eventually increases the impact of private information xA
on the optimal rating.
4 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
In order to ensure uniqueness of equilibrium, we know that the precision of in-
vestors' private information must not become too low compared to the precision of
information that is publicly available on the market. Since the announcement of a
rating increases the precision of public information above that of the prior distri-
bution of ¯rm quality µ, the su±cient condition for a unique equilibrium becomes
stricter after introducing a rating agency into the market. From the optimal rating
strategy (10), we know that z displays a variance of 1=[(1¡r2)a+(1¡r1 ¡r2)c],
so that the uniqueness condition can be rewritten as:
b >
((2 ¡ r2)a + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c)2
2¼
: (11)
For a unique equilibrium to hold, investors' private information has to be su±-
ciently precise, not only relative to the precision of public information, a, but also
relative to the precision of the CRA's private information, c. Rearranging the11
uniqueness condition allows a slightly di®erent view:9
1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2 <
p
2¼b ¡ a(2 ¡ r2)
c
:
Hence, a unique equilibrium prevails as long as the CRA does not attach a too
high weight to her reputational aim. If this is the case, we know from (10) that
the CRA's private signal xA does not dominate the rating z too strongly, so that
the \amount" of new information that becomes public via the rating is limited.
Note that the higher the ¯rm's fundamental risk, 1=a, the larger may the factor
(1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2) be for the uniqueness condition to still be satis¯ed. As an intuition
for this result consider that the higher a ¯rm's initial fundamental uncertainty,
the more valuable is the rating for investors' assessment of the unknown ¯rm
quality. Hence, for ¯rms with high fundamental uncertainty, the CRA's private
information may dominate the rating to a large degree in order to compensate
for the high variance in ¯rm quality and the resulting fundamental uncertainty,
before the rating starts to ful¯ll other, not necessarily informational purposes.
For ¯rms with a low variance of ¯rm quality, 1=a, in contrast, the rating is hardly
needed to dispense with the remaining fundamental uncertainty and therefore
may easily ful¯ll a coordinating role as put forward in Boot et al. (2005). Hence,
in order to reduce the emergence of multiple equilibria, it may be useful to induce
credit rating agencies to pursue several objectives. By doing so, the importance
that the CRAs attach to their reputational aim decreases so that multiplicity of
equilibria may be prevented. The emergence of multiple equilibria vice versa a
unique equilibrium is therefore very susceptible to the CRA's combined role of
both an information intermediary and a coordinator of investors' behavior that is
at the heart of our analysis.
However, even if the rating agency derives her optimal rating from a complex
utility function as given in (8), there is still a considerable chance of multiple
equilibria arising after the public announcement of a rating - even if a unique
equilibrium prevailed before. If private information on the part of investors is not
su±ciently precise, i.e. for a2=(2¼) < b < ((2¡r2)a+(1¡r1 ¡r2)c)2=(2¼), intro-
ducing a CRA leads to a switch from a unique equilibrium to multiple equilibria
because the rating announcement increases the precision of public information on
the market and thereby reduces the heterogeneity of investors' posterior beliefs
about ¯rm quality.
Yet, the existence of a CRA may still be bene¯cial. Since in the case of multiple
equilibria investors' beliefs are self-ful¯lling, the result of each investors' optimality
considerations is very susceptible to sunspots, i.e. exogenous incidences that help
to coordinate investors' behavior. As for the indicated range of precision values b
the market was governed by a unique equilibrium before the introduction of the
CRA, it is reasonable to believe that the formerly optimal behavior might a®ect
the new situation. For further explanation see ¯gure 1. It represents equilibrium
conditions (6) and (5) for the cases with and without a rating agency. In the case
9Since the weights in the CRA's utility function are bounded above by 1, we neglect the
remaining condition of 1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2 >
a(2¡r2)¡
p
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Figure 1: Unique versus multiple equilibria
without a CRA, the unique equilibrium is given by µ¤
W. Let us assume that after
the introduction of a CRA, investors' private information is no longer su±ciently
precise to prevent multiplicity of equilibria. Therefore two stable equilibria, A
and B, and one unstable equilibrium in mixed strategies in µ¤ emerge. As long
as µ¤
W does not coincide with µ¤, the market may both coordinate on the more
e±cient equilibrium A, in which all investors roll over their debt for µ > µA, or
on the rather ine±cient equilibrium B, in which all investors roll over their debt
only for µ > µB, with µB > µA. Before the presence of the CRA, in contrast,
investors rolled over their debt for E(µjxi) > µ¤
W. If µ¤
W > µ¤, as depicted in the
¯gure, investors withdrew their money for a relatively large range of values µ in
the unique equilibrium case. As such, after the introduction of the CRA, it may
appear reasonable for them to follow a similar strategy and to withdraw their
money rather than to roll over their loans for all intermediate values µ 2 [µA;µB].
In this case, the market would move to the ine±cient equilibrium B.
In contrast, if µ¤
W < µ¤, it is very likely that in the multiple equilibria setting,
the market will now coordinate on the e±cient action so that the ¯rm will not be
forced into default as easily and equilibrium A is reached. This is due to the fact
that in the unique equilibrium case without the rating agency, investors optimally
withdrew their money only for very low project qualities, i.e. for E(µjxi) · µ¤
W.
The switch to a multiple equilibria setting will then induce investors to rely on
a similar strategy, so that they will foreclose their credit for µ · µA and extend
otherwise.
Hence, whenever investors' private information is not su±ciently precise and
µ¤
W > µ¤, introducing a CRA to the market should lead to the rather ine±-
cient equilibrium B, whereas for µ¤
W < µ¤, equilibrium should converge to A,
the more e±cient one. However, uniqueness of equilibrium can be reinstored if13
market participants are willing to increase the precision of their private informa-
tion. If it is possible for them to invest in (costly) information collection and
procession, thereby increasing the precision of their private information, they are
in essence able to choose between unique or multiple equilibria after the CRA
has emerged. Since debt-holders su®er from the downside-risk of losing all the
money that they borrowed to the ¯rm while not holding an upside chance, we
may reasonably assume that both investors and the ¯rm prefer to reduce the in-
cidence of default. Therefore, it would be reasonable for market participants to
invest in the precision of their private information whenever µ¤
W > µ¤, in order
to achieve a unique equilibrium that would reduce the probability of default to
prob(default)= ©(
p
a(µ¤ ¡ y)). Otherwise, the existence of a CRA would induce
the ine±cient equilibrium B in which the ¯rm's debt will default unless very high
quality values µ > µB are realized. For µ¤
W < µ¤, however, investors and the ¯rm
would prefer multiple equilibria to the unique equilibrium outcome since this is
likely to reduce the ¯rm's probability of default to prob(default)= ©(
p
a(µA¡y)).
Investors' incentive to increase the precision of private information is therefore
highest if µ¤
W > µ¤. As is shown in appendix B, this is the case for a su±ciently
high rating z. Hence, for su±ciently high ratings z investors prefer a unique
equilibrium vis-¶ a-vis multiple equilibria. For su±ciently low ratings, in contrast,
it holds that µ¤ > µ¤
W, so that investors prefer multiple equilibria. Proposition 1
summarizes the results obtained so far:
Proposition 1 For a2=(2¼) < b < ((2 ¡ r2)a + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c)2=(2¼), the intro-
duction of a CRA increases the number of equilibria. If the CRA announces a
su±ciently high rating, investors have a high incentive to invest in the precision of
their private information in order to eliminate multiple equilibria, thereby increas-
ing the e±ciency of the market outcome. Whenever a low rating is announced,
however, the market is likely to coordinate on the most e±cient among multiple
equilibria without any investment in private information collection.
Interestingly, this di®erence in preferences for equilibrium outcomes coincides with
regulatory requirements as far as institutional investors are concerned. In almost
any country, institutional investors are allowed to invest only in bonds with high
ratings (investment-grade, \mÄ undelsicher", etc.). At the same time, institutional
investors usually dispose of research and analysis departments that supply them
with additional private information. This has often been taken as evidence for a
too low precision of credit ratings, since otherwise it would not have been worth-
while for investors to look for additional sources of information (Partnoy, 1999).
According to our analysis, however, it is not the lack of precision in credit ratings
but rather the opposite: rating announcements increase the precision of public
information too strongly and hence destroy uniqueness of equilibrium. For ¯rms
with high bond ratings, however, investors prefer a unique equilibrium as this
minimizes the probability of default. Hence, agents' incentive to invest in infor-
mation is highest when investment is in ¯rms with high-graded bonds, which is
exactly what institutional investors are con¯ned to.
Note that in contrast to Carlson and Hale (2005), the CRA in our setup does not
disclose her private information to the market but a combination of her posterior14
information and - indirectly - of her expectation about the ¯rm's default prob-
ability. If investors knew the CRA's speci¯c utility function and if equilibrium
were unique, they would be able to deduce the expected probability of default.
With multiple equilibria, this is no longer true. In this case, the rating agency in
essence has a strategic choice of whether to announce a default probability that
corresponds to the e±cient or to the ine±cient equilibrium. But still, investors
could choose to reduce the uncertainty emerging from the multiplicity of equilibria
by investing in the precision of their private information.
The di®erence in e±ciency-loss between equilibrium B and A furthermore in-
creases in the precision of information that is public on the market. This is due to
the fact that the cumulative normal distribution function gets steeper the more
precise public information is relative to private information (Morris and Shin,
1999) as can be seen from ¯gure 2. By increasing the precision of the rating,
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Figure 2: E®ects of an increase in the relative precision of public information
equilibrium B becomes even less e±cient, as the equilibrium moves to B' to the
right, while equilibrium A becomes even more e±cient by moving to the left to
A'. If we assume that a larger di®erence in e±ciency levels between the two stable
equilibria in the multiple equilibria case raises the uncertainty in the market, then
a higher precision of public information due to a more precise rating will induce
investors to increase the precision of their private information as well. In this re-
spect, the existence of credit rating agencies sparks o® a virtuous circle: the more
precise an agency's rating assessment is, the higher is the incentive for investors
to collect more precise private information themselves in order to restore a unique
equilibrium and eliminate the uncertainty stemming from the unpredictability of
multiple self-ful¯lling equilibria. This result delivers proposition 2:
Proposition 2 The more precise the announced rating is, the larger is the di®er-
ence in e±ciency between the di®erent multiple equilibria. This raises investors'15
incentive to invest in the precision of their private information to reduce uncer-
tainty, thereby complementing the increase in the rating's precision.
5 Solicited Versus Unsolicited Ratings
In recent years, rating agencies have started to issue ratings that are not requested
by the target ¯rm and that will not be paid for. These \unsolicited" ratings rely
only on public information. Empirical studies on unsolicited ratings have raised
several questions regarding both the purpose and the informational content of
these rating assessments. In our setup unsolicited ratings may be characterized
by c = 0, since no private information enters the rating process. The unsolicited
rating zU is then given as:
zU = y ¡
r2
1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2
1
2
qÁ(¢)
p
a
@µ¤
@zU
: (12)
Due to the CRA's objective of preventing ine±cient default, even the unsolicited
rating is higher than the ex-ante expected ¯rm quality, y. For q ! 0, i.e. for
decreasing importance of the feedback-argument, however, the unsolicited rating
converges to y. Generally, the unsolicited rating increases in y, q, r1 and r2 and
decreases in 1¡r1¡r2. It will therefore be higher the better the ex-ante expected
¯rm quality y is, the higher the future fees q are, the more weight the CRA
attaches to competitive and feedback arguments and the less importance is given
to the reputational concern.
If we assume a solicited rating zS to be characterized by c > 0, it stands to reason
whether zS turns out to be higher or lower than zU if the ¯rm discloses con¯dential
information to the agency. For the di®erence between zS and zU, we ¯nd:
zS ¡ zU =
(1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c
(1 ¡ r2)a + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c
(xA ¡ y) +
r2
1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2
1
2
q Á(¢)[
p
a
@µ¤
@zU
¡
p
a + c
@µ¤
@zS
]
Thus, provided that the CRA's private information, xA, turns out to be su±ciently
higher (lower) than the ex-ante expected ¯rm quality, y, the solicited rating will
be higher (lower) than the unsolicited assessment.
Corollary 1 A solicited rating will only deviate from an unsolicited one if the
CRAs private information, xA, and ex-ante expected ¯rm quality, y, deviate suf-
¯ciently strongly. For su±ciently high (low) private information compared to y,
the solicited rating will be higher than an unsolicited rating.
Nevertheless, the provision of private information does not necessarily increase
any agency's private information precision c by the same amount. Rather, we
may interpret a speci¯c value of c > 0 as the \ability" of the CRA to gather and
process the information privately provided by the ¯rm.10
10In this respect, the \ability" of a rating agency would require a solicited rating as a necessary
condition.16
The solicited rating zS as given by (10) behaves in the same way as the unsolicited
with regard to y and q. It is furthermore intuitive to see that it increases in the
face value of the rating agency's private information, xA. For the in°uence of the
agency's private information precision c, however, we ¯nd the following:
@zS
@c
=
(1 ¡ r2)(1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)a
[(1 ¡ r2)a + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c]2(xA ¡ y) ¡
r2
1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2
1
2
q ¢
"
1
2
p
a + c
Á(¢)
@µ¤
@zS
+
p
a + c
Ã
@Á(¢)
@c
+
@ @µ¤
@zS
@c
!#
: (13)
Interestingly, the e®ect of c on the optimal solicited rating depends on the dif-
ference between the CRA's private information and the prior information about
¯rm quality, i.e. on xA ¡ y. Obviously, for su±ciently high xA as compared to
the ex-ante expected ¯rm quality y, this partial derivative will be positive. The
opposite holds for very low xA.
What further implications can be derived with regard to the e®ect of the CRA's
ability on the solicited rating? Based on the in°uence of c as given in (13), we ¯nd
the following. For very small future fees, i.e. q ! 0, so that the feedback argument
will hardly in°uence the optimal rating, the in°uence of c on the solicited rating
depends solely on the factor:
(1 ¡ r2)(1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)a
[(1 ¡ r2)a + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c]2 (xA ¡ y) :
Di®erentiating the ¯rst factor with respect to the weights in the CRA's utility
function shows that for su±ciently high precision of the CRA's private information
this factor increases in r1 and r2 and decreases in 1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2.11 Hence, a rating
agency of high ability, i.e. that disposes of very precise private information, will
give a higher solicited rating for su±ciently good private information (i.e. high
xA) as compared to a CRA of lower ability, if she attaches lower weight to her
reputational aim and puts more emphasis on competitive and feedback concerns.
For su±ciently bad private information, i.e. low xA, in contrast, she will give a
lower solicited rating as a CRA of lower ability. Therefore, the statement that
only rating agencies of high ability can a®ord to deviate strongly from the average
rating holds, provided that these agencies do not put too much weight on their
reputational objective. In the case of a unique equilibrium we may reasonably
assume this condition to be satis¯ed.
Corollary 2 CRAs of su±ciently high ability will announce more extreme so-
licited ratings than agencies of lower ability, if they attach relatively low weight to
their reputation objective.
Analyzing the in°uence that fundamental uncertainty 1=a has on the optimal
11For proof, see appendix C.17
solicited rating, delivers:
@zS
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=
(1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)r2cxA + [(1 ¡ r2)2a + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)(1 ¡ r2)c + (1 ¡ r2)r2a]y
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:
In order to interpret this result, assume again that q ! 0, so that the feedback
argument becomes negligible. We then ¯nd that for positive private information,
xA, and ex-ante expected ¯rm quality, y, the solicited rating decreases in funda-
mental uncertainty. For negative xA and y, the opposite holds. Both are su±cient
conditions. As an intuition for this result, consider that higher fundamental un-
certainty implies that the unknown ¯rm quality µ might lie far apart from the
ex-ante expected value y. For high values of y, there is a considerable likelihood
that µ will be much lower, while the opposite is true for low values of y.
Finally, how does the structure of the CRA's utility function, i.e. weights r1 and
r2, in°uence the solicited rating? By looking at the derivatives of zS with respect
to r1 and r2, we ¯nd that both are positive (negative) for su±ciently low (high)
private signals, xA, as compared to ex-ante expected ¯rm quality, y. The proof can
be obtained from appendix D. Hence, we ¯nd that for su±ciently \bad" private
information obtained by the CRA, i.e. for su±ciently low xA, the optimal solicited
rating zS increases in weights r1 and r2 but decreases in (1¡r1¡r2). The opposite
holds for su±ciently \good" private information xA. Stated di®erently, the more
weight a rating agency places on her reputation (as compared to competitive and
feedback concerns), the lower will her rating be in case of bad private information
about the ¯rm and the higher will it be in case of good private information about
µ. The opposite holds if she puts less emphasis on her reputation. The results are
summed up in the following corollary:
Corollary 3 For su±ciently high private information, the optimal solicited rat-
ing will (i) decrease in fundamental uncertainty, 1=a, (ii) decrease in the weight
attached to the competitive argument, r1, (iii) decrease in the weight put to the
feedback argument, r2 and (iv) increase in the emphasis attached to the repuational
aim. The opposite holds for su±ciently low private information.
Before analyzing the e®ect that unsolicited and solicited ratings may have on
the market outcome, let us consider their role with regard to the uniqueness of
equilibrium. Even though the condition for a unique equilibrium is less strict if
the rating agency announces only unsolicited ratings, as public information on
the market in this case comprises only the common knowledge about the ¯rm's
quality distribution, and hence complies with the uniqueness condition in the
absence of a rating agency, the existence of a CRA may not induce the mentioned
virtuous circle, either. The practice of announcing unsolicited ratings that are
not requested by the ¯rms may therefore endanger the process of information
aggregation on the market. If investors' private information is not su±ciently
precise so that multiple equilibria arise, the di®erence in e±ciency between the18
ine±cient and the e±cient equilibrium may not be large enough to induce market
participants to invest in the precision of their information. Hence, the practice
of generating unsolicited ratings endangers the virtuous circle originally triggered
by the announcement of very precise rating assessments.
Are our results in line with the empirical results on the di®erence between so-
licited and unsolicited ratings? There is more or less consensus in the empirical
literature that unsolicited ratings are lower than solicited ones.12 However, there
are two interpretations that are consistent with this di®erence that is also known
in the literature as the \downward bias". The ¯rst is the so-called \punishment
hypothesis". Under the punishment hypothesis, a rating agency that is compen-
sated by ¯rms, whose securities are being rated by the agency, has an incentive
to assign higher ratings to ¯rms who pay for the service than to issuers who do
not. Thus, rating agencies announce unsolicited ratings as a means to blackmail
issuers. The second hypothesis may be denoted as the \private information hy-
pothesis". It states that the observed lower unsolicited ratings are the result of
self selection based on private information. Of course, this interpretation is more
in line with our results. Interestingly, however, our model indicates that it is
not the ¯rm quality per se that in°uences the solicited rating but that it is the
di®erence between the CRA's perception of ¯rm quality, i.e. private signal xA,
and the ex-ante commonly expected ¯rm quality, y. Notice that the power of a
rating agency to select the equilibrium in case of multiple equilibria also contains
an element of blackmailing. Interestingly, recent empirical studies con¯rm mainly
the private information story (Byoun and Shin ,2003, and Gan, 2004). In ad-
dition, studies that investigate the stock market reaction of rating changes from
unsolicited to solicited ratings ¯nd a signi¯cant negative stock market reaction
to rating downgrades (GÄ uttler and Behr, 2005). This is also consistent with our
theory, as will be shown in the following section.
6 Market E®ects
In the following, we assume that the condition for a unique equilibrium holds, i.e.
we assume that investors obtain private information of su±cient precision, respec-
tively that the rating agency attaches a su±ciently low weight to her reputation
concern. From the analysis in section 2 we know that the ex-ante probability of
default is given by
prob (default) = prob(µ · µ
¤) = ©(
p
a(µ
¤ ¡ y)) :
Obviously, the likelihood of default increases in equilibrium value µ¤, so that all
model parameters that reduce µ¤ will automatically decrease the probability of
default as well.
With rational expectations, investors will learn that the rating's precision d is
given by (1 ¡ r2)a + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c. Plugging this into the equilibrium equation
12See Byoun and Smith (2002), Poon (2003), Poon and Firth (2004), Gan (2004), and GÄ uttler
and Behr (2005) for evidence in this regard.19
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As can easily be seen, the probability of default decreases in the ex-ante expected
¯rm quality, y, in the announced rating, z, and in the o®ered repayment rate, R.
But how does µ¤ compare to the equilibrium value in the absence of a credit rating
agency, µ¤
W? From the following comparison:
µ
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W > µ
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(15)
we ¯nd that the introduction of a rating agency reduces the probability of default
(by reducing the interval in which default occurs with certainty from [0;µ¤
W] to
[0;µ¤]) as long as µ¤ lies su±ciently below z, i.e. as long as the rating agency
announces a su±ciently high rating. In this case, the l.h.s. of inequality (15) will
be positive by assumption, while the r.h.s. is negative, so that the inequality is
satis¯ed. From the preceding section we know that a (solicited) rating increases,
among other factors, in the prior expected ¯rm quality, y, in the CRA's private
information xA and in future fees q. Furthermore, the di®erence between the
solicited and the unsolicited rating raises along with the precision of the CRA's
private information if the face value of the CRA's private signal deviates positively
from y. Hence, for ¯rms that are able to con¯de su±ciently optimistic information
about business prospects to the CRA despite a pessimistic prior expected ¯rm
quality, the probability of default will decrease after the announcement of a rating.
This contributes to the mentioned \private information hypothesis", that relates
the di®erence between solicited and unsolicited ratings to an adverse selection
problem. Our model is even more precise in showing that ¯rms have a high
incentive to request a solicited rating in order to reduce their probability of default
if they believe to be treated unfair by the market, i.e. whenever they believe to
be able to disclose much more optimistic private information to the CRA than
what has a priori been expected.
Proposition 3 In order to reduce the probability of default, ¯rms will request
a (solicited) rating if they believe that they are able to disclose more optimistic
information to the credit rating agency than what has a priori been expected by
the market, i.e. for xA À y.
Since equilibrium value µ¤ decreases in the announced rating, it follows naturally
from corollary 3 that for su±ciently high xA, the probability of default will increase
in fundamental uncertainty, 1=a and in weights r1 and r2. For su±ciently low
private information xA, the opposite results are obtained. Hence, the introduction20
of a rating agency is not necessarily bene¯cial only for ¯rms of high quality, as has
been stated by Carlson and Hale (2005). Rather the bene¯ts of a rating agency
are contingent on a very complex system of parameter variations.
7 Institutional Investors
Investors on bond markets can usually be categorized into two di®erent groups.
They are either small, individual investors, or large and institutionalized market
participants. As institutional investors typically hold their own research depart-
ments, they are also presumably much better informed about ¯rm quality than
small investors. In order to bring this structure into our model, we assume in
this section that the market consists of proportion ¸ of institutional investors
that observe private information about the ¯rm with precision ¹ b and proportion
(1 ¡ ¸) of small investors with information of precision b with ¹ b ¸ b. In many
countries, institutional investors are furthermore restricted with regard to their
investment choice. We build this restriction in our model by assuming that in-
stitutional investors are only allowed to invest in bonds with a rating at least as
high as ~ z. In contrast to Boot et al. (2005), we do not, however, rely on the
simplifying assumption that whenever a bond obtains a su±ciently high (usually
investment-grade) rating all institutional investors always invest. Even though
the market is sometimes so tight that they have to rely on this strategy, we rather
consider the case where institutional market participants may but not necessarily
have to invest in investment-grade ¯rms. Hence, in the following we assume that
institutional investors have to withdraw for z < ~ z, but do not necessarily have to
roll over for z ¸ ~ z.
What does this segregation of the buy-side in the bond market imply for the
market equilibrium? Whenever the CRA announces a rating z < ~ z, we know that
institutional investors never roll over their debt but always withdraw their money.
Hence the condition for imminent default of the ¯rm is changed to:
µ = ¸ + (1 ¡ ¸)©(
p
b(xi ¡ µ)) :
This delivers a unique equilibrium value of µ¤
1:
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:
It is obvious to see that µ¤
1 ¸ µ¤, so that for su±ciently low ratings z < ~ z, the
probability of default is increased by the existence of institutional investors.
If the CRA instead announces a rating of z ¸ ~ z, whether or not institutional
investors roll over their loans depends on their posterior beliefs about µ, so that21
equilibrium value µ¤
2 is given by:
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While it always holds that µ¤
2 · µ¤
1, we ¯nd that µ¤
2 · µ¤ whenever repayment
R > 2 (as a su±cient condition), while µ¤
2 > µ¤ for R < 2, as:
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For R > 2, this inequality is satis¯ed because the l.h.s. is negative by assumption
while the r.h.s. is positive. The following corollary sums up the results:
Corollary 4 The existence of institutional investors reduces the probability of de-
fault for ¯rms rated investment-grade, whenever su±ciently high repayment values
R are o®ered. For ratings below investment-grade, however, their existence raises
the risk of ine±cient ¯rm default due to regulatory reasons.
8 Conclusion
Since the proposal of the Basel 2 accord, that requires inclusion of borrowers'
credit ratings in assessing banks' capital adequacy, general interest in the credit
rating industry has greatly increased. Lacking a convincing theoretical basis,
empirical and descriptive studies have often come to the conclusion that the credit-
rating agency is \curiously devoid of competition and oversight", of which it
desperately \needs more" (The Economist, 2005). Moody's Bond Rating Service,
a major rating institution, has even been declared as one of the \two superpowers
in the world today" (Partnoy, 1999) - together with the United States-, and has
been accused of being able to make a \grown man cry" (Euromoney, 1998).
Focussing on a rigorous theoretical analysis and accounting for a complex utility
function, we ¯nd that credit rating agencies may nevertheless be a benefactor to
¯nancial markets. In particular, they may spark o® a virtuous circle that sup-
ports information aggregation, thereby increasing market e±ciency. This result
is due to the fact that rating announcements and private information collection
prove to be complements rather than substitutes. Hence, the release of precise
credit ratings induces market participants to invest in the precision of their pri-
vate information as well. On the downside, however, the recent practice by the
agencies of announcing unsolicited ratings destroys this virtuous circle. Since un-
solicited ratings are based only on publicly available information, they cannot be22
as accurate as ratings that are actually requested by the ¯rms and that comprise
also facts that are con¯dentially disclosed to the rating agencies. Anticipating
the lower precision, bond holders reduce their investment in private information
precision, which undermines the benevolent e®ect of credit ratings on information
aggregation.
With regard to explaining the observed di®erence between solicited and unsolicited
ratings, our model recommends the \private information hypothesis" that has
also been supported by recent empirical work. Following from our model only
those ¯rms will request a solicited rating that believe to be treated unfairly by
the market, i.e. that expect to be able to disclose more optimistic information
about ¯rm quality to the credit rating agency than has a priori been expected.
This argument leads to a natural adverse selection between ¯rms that request a
solicited rating and those who do not, and contributes to explaining the observed
downward-bias in unsolicited ratings.23
Appendix
Appendix A
From the analysis in section 2 we know that the probability of ¯rm default is given
by prob(µ · µ¤), while the CRA holds a posterior belief about the ¯rm's quality
of:
µjxA » N
³ay + cxA
a + c
;
1
a + c
´
:
The CRA's expected utility function can therefore be derived as:
Eui(zi;µ) = ¡(1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)(zi ¡ E(µjxA))
2 ¡ r1E(Li ¡ ¹ LjxA) ¡ r2 q prob(µ · µ
¤jxA)
= ¡(1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)(zi ¡ E(µjxA))
2 ¡ r1E(z
2
i ¡ 2zi¹ z + ¹ z
2 ¡
Z
z
2
j ¡ 2zj¹ z + ¹ z
2djjxA)
¡r2 q ©(
p
a + c(µ
¤ ¡
ay + cxA
a + c
)) : (16)
Derivation with respect to zi and setting equal to zero delivers the optimal rating
as given in (9)
Following Morris and Shin (2002), we assume a linear strategy as optimal for a
rating agency:
zi = k1xA + k2y + k3
1
2
qÁ(¢)
p
a + c
@µ¤
@zi
: (17)
This allows to average over all potential ratings:
E(¹ zjxA) = k1
ay + cxA
a + c
+ k2y + k3
1
2
qÁ(¢)
p
a + c
@µ¤
@zi
; (18)
since E(xAjjxAi) = E(µjxAi). Plugging this into the optimal rating function (9)
yields:
zi =
(1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c + r1k1c
(1 ¡ r2)(a + c)
xA +
(1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)a + r1k1a + r1k2(a + c)
(1 ¡ r2)(a + c)
y
+
r1k3 ¡ r2
1 ¡ r2
1
2
qÁ(¢)
p
a + c
@µ¤
@zi
:
Comparing coe±cients to (17) gives us the weights attached to the three argu-
ments of the optimal rating strategy:
k1 =
(1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c
(1 ¡ r2)a ¡ (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c
;
k2 =
(1 ¡ r2)a
(1 ¡ r2)a + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c
;
and
k3 = ¡
r2
1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2
:24
Appendix B
It is optimal for investors to invest in the precision of their private information, if
µ¤
W > µ¤, since otherwise multiple equilibria will lead to the ine±cient equilibrium.
This condition is satis¯ed, if:
µ
¤
W > µ
¤
a
p
b
(µ
¤
W ¡ y) ¡
r
a + b
b
©
¡1
³R ¡ 1
R
´
>
1
p
b
³
a((2 ¡ r2)µ
¤ ¡ y ¡ (1 ¡ r1)z) + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c(µ
¤ ¡ z)
¡
p
(2 ¡ r2)a + b + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c©
¡1
³R ¡ 1
R
´´
µ
¤
W ¡ µ
¤ > [1 ¡ r1 + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)
c
a
](µ
¤ ¡ z)
+
1
a
©
¡1
³R ¡ 1
R
´
¢[
p
a + b ¡
p
(2 ¡ r2)a + b + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c]
Since the l.h.s. of the inequality will be positive, if µ¤
W > µ¤, the inequality will
be satis¯ed for su±ciently high ratings, i.e. for z > µ¤ and R < 2, because the
r.h.s. will then be negative. It also holds for z À µ¤.
Appendix C
With respect to the two weights, r1 and r2, we ¯nd:
@
(1¡r2)(1¡r1¡r2)a
[(1¡r2)a+(1¡r1¡r2)c]2
@r1
=
(1 ¡ r2)a[(1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c ¡ (1 ¡ r2)a]
[(1 ¡ r2)a + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c]3
and
@
(1¡r2)(1¡r1¡r2)a
[(1¡r2)a+(1¡r1¡r2)c]2
@r2
=
ar1[(1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c ¡ (1 ¡ r2)a]
[(1 ¡ r2)a + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c]3 ;
which are both positive if c >
1¡r2
1¡r1¡r2a and negative otherwise. For the in°uence
of (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2) exactly the opposite result is obtained.
Appendix D
@zS
@r1
=
(1 ¡ r2)ca(y ¡ xA)
[(1 ¡ r2)a + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c]2¡
r2
1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2
1
2
q Á(¢)
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h @µ¤
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+
@ @µ¤
@zS
@r1
i
This partial derivative is positive for either y À xA or for y > xA and q ! 0 and
negative for y ¿ xA or for y < xA and q ! 0.
@zS
@r2
=
acr1(y ¡ xA)
[(1 ¡ r2)a + (1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2)c]2¡
1
1 ¡ r1 ¡ r2
1
2
q Á(¢)
p
a + c
h
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@ @µ¤
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i
This partial derivative is positive for y À xA and negative for y ¿ xA.25
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